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UNIVERSALS, RELATIVISM AND MUSIC EDUCATION 
 
In 1929, Karl Mannheim wrote a penetrating sociological-historical essay 
exploring the ways human knowledge stabilizes and transforms social order. Among his 
more intriguing observations: 
...[I]t has become extremely questionable whether, in the flux of life, it is a 
genuinely worthwhile intellectual problem to seek to discover fixed and 
immutable ideas or absolutes. It is a more worthy intellectual task perhaps to 
learn to think dynamically and relationally rather than statically... [T]hose 
persons who claim to have discovered an absolute are usually the same people 
who claim to be superior to the rest.1 
In Mannheim's view, claims to immutability or absoluteness function ideologically: they 
maintain a sociopolitical status quo by helping sustain the illusion it is natural and 
inevitable. "The absolute," says Mannheim, is "an instrument used by those who profit 
from it, to distort, pervert, and conceal the meaning of the present."2 
Most contemporary philosophy shares at least some of Mannheim's suspicion 
toward absolutes, essences, universals, and claims to foundational status.3 Philosophical 
orientations as divergent as phenomenology, Marxism, and pragmatism (to say nothing 
of a burgeoning 'postmodern' literature) see the forms and canons of cognitive inquiry as 
historically emergent and culturally constructed. On these views, what counts as truth, 
reality, goodness, or beauty depends upon perspective. There are many ways the world 
may be properly construed to be rather than a single way it 'is', independent of time, 
circumstance, and human interest. Appeals to absoluteness and universality represent 
efforts to privilege certain views, beliefs, tastes, or preferences over others. 
Empirical research, once presumed capable of achieving utter objectivity and 
generating value-free knowledge has gradually come to acknowledge the contingency of 
its 'findings', the reliance of the known upon knowers, and the limitations that 
situatedness imposes upon even the most hard-nosed investigation. In music education 
growing numbers of researchers are drawn to "qualitative" methodologies which 
exchange ideals of air tight controls, utter objectivity, and eternal verities for rich, thick 
description of complex experiential realities. The coexistence of competing 'true' 
interpretations is an idea that enjoys considerable currency. Inquiry has taken a marked, 
perhaps irreversible turn away from objectivist, universalist paradigms and their 
intractably dualistic baggage. Our world-views have become strikingly relativized. 
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In light of this interpretive turn toward plurality, diversity, and relativity, it is 
interesting to note the extent to which music education's philosophical and professional 
literature continues to embrace assumptions of absoluteness, universality, and uniformity. 
Despite the overwhelming diversity of musical practices, many music educators continue 
to speak of music's nature and value in the singular, to seek professional identity and 
guidance in presumed musical absolutes, and to champion the existence of musical 
qualities that are 'intrinsic', 'essential', 'universal'. The suggestion that music might better 
be seen as a range of contextually-embedded and disparate practices, attended by 
'natures' and 'values' that are multiple, diverse, fluid, conditional, and sometimes 
oppositional, is one that often elicits nervous allegations of relativism. Either, it is 
apparently assumed, music's nature and value are the same for everyone everywhere -- 
uniform and absolute -- or they are mere illusions. 
In this essay, I want to look this relativistic demon in the face: to ask, in the spirit 
of the pragmatic tradition, What might it mean for music education were we to 
acknowledge the multiplicity of musical natures and values, and to attempt to make that 
multiplicity a constitutive feature of its professional identity? I will argue that relativism 
is not necessarily a menace, and that its has the potential to help us better understand our 
selves, each other, our musical endeavors, and our profession. 
 
I: Universals and Essences 
 
Music education philosophers commonly take as given the existence a 
foundational level where all music, or at least all music that truly warrants being called 
music, is basically the same, does essentially the same thing. Beneath the infinitely 
diverse sonorous presences designated 'music', it is presumed, lie features universally and 
intrinsically musical for whose perception and enjoyment all human ears and minds are 
more or less hard-wired. These essential and universal qualities perform two jobs for us. 
They confer unity upon an otherwise radically diverse array of musics and musical 
doings; and they enable us to distinguish music from non-music, good music from bad, 
music worth teaching from that which is not. Good music is music that is more 
authentically musical, that taps into more of music's essential qualities. Music of lesser 
quality has fewer essentially or intrinsically musical features and too many inessential or 
extramusical ones. Since there is one foundational job it falls to all music to do, questions 
of musical value are easily decided. Since all music is and does the same essential thing, 
music that does not do whatever is deemed essential is less than musical. Difference 
means inferiority.  
2
Visions of Research in Music Education, Vol. 15 [2010], Art. 6
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/vrme/vol15/iss1/6
 
   
3 
Such beliefs usually play themselves out in music education in ways like these: 
proper music education helps people understand or experience music in authentically and 
purely musical terms; it is dedicated to helping people enjoy music for what it 'really is', 
as opposed to other, presumably nonmusical or extramusical ways of construing it. There 
is an inner essence of music, and music education is devoted to helping people perceive 
and experience it. The form of this argument with which most North American music 
educators will be most familiar is one in which the proper musical stance is one of rapt, 
vigilant contemplation of, and expressive commerce with, the music alone, as it is 'in 
itself'. On this view, music education helps teach people to suppress awareness of 
nonmusical things like references or sociopolitical involvements, to cure them of 
subjective associations, and so on.  
The alternative view I intend to explore here is that there is no essence of music, 
only a constellation of sonorous human doings and practices to which people find it 
convenient to apply the label 'music'. These doings are diverse and divergent, without a 
common essential core; with only what philosophers sometimes describe as family 
resemblances. 4 The difference between non-musical, pre-musical, and musical sounds is 
acquired, negotiable, more a matter of habit and transient consensus than hard-wired 
essence. Musics exist in fields of human action that are fluid and unstable, with uses, 
meanings, and values that are radically multiple. Accordingly, differences among musical 
practices are not differences in musical value; they are just differences. 
Belief that there is a way all (genuine) music 'is' invariably privileges certain 
musics, usually by declaring their value 'objective' and culturally transcendent, while 
demeaning the significant remainder as aberrant subjective musings or as arbitrary results 
of acculturation. However, to achieve the cultural transcendence necessary to this claim, 
music's value must be situated outside the psychological or sociopolitical realms of 
human experience. Untainted by the vacillations and contingencies of the human 
condition, such value is not local, not dependent upon connections with anything else for 
its validity. It is not relative, but absolute, unconditional, universal. Inspiring and 
comforting though this idea may be, it rests on a number of logically incongruous 
notions: a point of view without perspective, a place without location, a view from 
everywhere.  
I suggest we entertain an alternative view, one that I think avoids at least some of 
the conceptual encumbrances to which I have just alluded. I would like to advance that 
musical value is always value for some end or purpose, that it can only be gauged relative 
to that end or purpose, and further, that such ends or purposes are both multiple and ever 
changing. What is intrinsic or extrinsic to a given music is always relative to the field of 
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human action in which it is embedded. Musical meaning cannot be culturally 
transcendent because music is culture. Thus, the ideals and qualities we have been 
encouraged to regard as universal are culture-specific. There is no essence of music 
separate from the way our words and actions situate it; no music that is meaningful 
without regard to context; no music that is independent of the contingencies of the 
sociopolitical world of human interaction. Indeed, there is no objective point outside of 
culture and acculturation from which we might scrutinize the whole of 'music' in order to 
verify pronouncements about its 'essential' nature and value. Or, if there is such a place, it 
is not inhabited by human beings. There is no 'most purely musical' state toward which 
music is inexorably progressing. Music has, then, neither 'a' nature nor 'a' value. It only 
has 'a' history, and close examination may reveal even that to be far more plural and 
refractory than we have long found it convenient to believe.  
This idea that all musics everywhere do the same thing (if with varying degrees of 
success) is part of the baggage of an idealistic philosophical tradition now undermined by 
a cognitive shift no less dramatic than the one brought about by Copernicus. Kant's 
recognition of the human contribution to all knowledge, Herder's recognition of the 
irreducibility of cultures and the diversity of 'human nature'5 Polanyi's insistence on the 
impossibility of a knowledge without perspective,6 Kuhn's description of paradigm shifts 
within science:7 each of these have profoundly, perhaps, permanently undermined 
essentialism, absolutism, foundationalism, and their many cognates. These insights, and 
those of thinkers from Hegel to Darwin to Wittgenstein as well, make it exceedingly 
difficult to cling to monolithic, universalistic accounts of things like 'reality', 'human 
nature', 'beauty' -- and, I suggest here, 'music' too. In the postmodern world, eternal and 
immutable verities are being replaced by migratory constellations of beliefs and desire, 
shaped and given meaning by people's experiences and interactions in their own diverse 
localities. 
From the apparently stable, secure standpoint of the essentialist world view, 
claims like those being advanced here are regressive and irresponsible. But perhaps the 
demise of essentialist security is not a real loss. Perhaps we will be the better for having 
learned to get along without it. Mannheim thought so. Without the idea absolutes, he 
writes, people will develop "a continual readiness to recognize that every point of view 
[read: 'every music'] is particular to a certain definite situation, and to find out through 
analysis of what this particularity consists."8 It is not just that absolutism and essentialism 
seem unsustainable, then, it is that their tendency to portray difference as inferiority 
blinds us to crucially important realms of musical meaning and value -- the social, 
historical, political, spiritual, and corporeal among them. By insisting that all worthwhile 
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music and instructional practice be one way, essentialism stigmatizes differences and 
marginalizes whole ranges of valid musical (and music educational) practice. 
 
II: Relativism, Pragmatism, Realism 
 
Instead of clinging to essences, absolutes, and eternal verities, perhaps music 
educators should be developing philosophical orientations that better account for the 
profound multiplicity of musical doings: orientations that describe rather than prescribe, 
orientations that accommodate and honor diversity, orientations that recognize the ever 
changing nature human interests and practices. Such orientations would be in some 
senses relativistic, but I think we should resist the assumption this is necessarily and 
unavoidably evil. Nor should we assume that those who characterize relativism as evil 
and menacing have no agenda of their own: people who find relativism threatening are 
frequently in the market for what Richard Rorty describes as "quick fixes and knock-
down arguments."9 Such fixes and such arguments seem curiously out of place in 
practices as complex and radically diverse as musical ones appear to be. 
To be sure, conceding relativity requires we accept the partiality and the fallibility 
of our beliefs and values. Only it hardly requires they be abjured altogether. Mannheim 
writes, "We must realize once and for all that the meanings which make up our world, are 
simply an historically determined and continuously developing structure in which man 
[sic] develops, and are in no sense absolute." But conceding the contingency, the 
transience, the contextually-relational character of meanings does not reduce them to 
mere illusions: "Knowledge arising out of our experience in actual life situations, though 
not absolute, is knowledge none the less." 10 Relativism need not contend that all criteria 
for rightness and wrongness, all assertions of musical worth, are equally defensible: that 
all music is beautiful in its own way. There is an important distinction between this silly 
claim and the entirely reasonable suggestion that criteria and standards "cannot be 
formulated absolutely, but only in terms of the perspective of a given situation."11 That 
all instances of knowledge and value are rooted in and therefore 'relative to' given 
'universes of discourse' does not destroy their 'validity': it only requires that we learn to 
think of 'validity' in other ways. 
We should also be clear that relativism of the kind I envision (let me designate it 
'serious' in order to contrast it with the silly, anything-goes variety that no responsible 
person would really espouse) is not an inversion of essentialism: that is, it takes pains to 
try and avoid making an absolute of its relativistic view. Put differently, I am not so 
much interested in establishing that all musics and musical values must be relative12 as in 
5
Bowman: Universals, Relativism, and Music Education
Published by OpenCommons@UConn, 2010
 
   
6 
resisting essentialist notions like musical absolutes and universals because of what I see 
as their distortive capacity. The position I want to advance is that the nature and value of 
music are plural and not the kinds of things we can rank hierarchically. There need be 
nothing insidious or antithetical to musical education in that, while there is, I believe, in 
the view that all music shares a common essence.  
Relativism, Rorty has suggested, is just the realist's pejorative label for 
pragmatism.13 To this realist, it is a matter of fundamental import that things like truth, 
goodness, and beauty be immutable and absolute: for unless they are, it is believed, we 
are left wholly without any basis for adjudicating rival claims. That is hardly the case, 
however. To acknowledge contingency and fallibility is not necessarily degenerate; and 
the relativity of musical value only stings as long as one continues to entertain the idea 
that there exists somewhere out there an accessible, non-relative alternative.14 Ideas and 
values like these are conceptual habits that have evolved in service of certain human 
needs; and the pragmatic view is that such habits can -- and should -- be replaced with 
better ones: but 'better' not on some universal scale of value; rather, 'better' in relation to 
the specific needs or ends our ideas and values serve. There are, a 'serious' relativist 
would argue, a number of goods to be gained by conceiving of our ideas and values as 
social constructions, not least among them the possibilities that extends for 
deconstruction and reconstruction. The idea of immutability can be replaced with 
historicity; timeless truths with flexible webs of negotiated belief; objectivity with 
intersubjective agreement-- and not just without adverse consequences but with distinctly 
positive outcomes. Chief among these is surely the way it would redirect our attention to 
what is distinctive or particular to situations, to things, and by extension I think, to 
musical practices and values.  
So perhaps we need to get over this notion that plurality, relativity, differences, 
and situatedness are defects. While we are right to be concerned about skepticism and 
nihilism, a serious relativist needs subscribe to neither. Relativism need not maintain that 
value judgments emanate from wholly incommensurable universes, or amount to nothing 
more substantial than self-serving rhetoric. Denying the possibility of wholly neutral or 
objective grounds from which to weigh rival claims does not reduce all value claims to 
personal preferences. But what of musical instruction? Without wholly objective grounds 
for assertions of musical values, is instruction reduced to indoctrination, the imposition 
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of tastes? Without objective standards located outside human interests, are all 
instructional decisions rendered arbitrary and defenseless? This all-or-nothing view is 
again the one advanced the realist, not the serious relativist or pragmatist. The demise of 
absolutes does not make anyone's musical value claims as good as anyone else's. We can 
continue to admire and honor "our" musics and mount compelling arguments in defense 
of our musical values without claiming at the same time that they are ultimate-- standards 
by which the worth of every music everywhere must be gauged. It is one thing to 
concede that there may be no truly neutral ground for adjudicating competing claims, but 
obviously quite another to say there is no ground at all. That something does not obtain 
for everyone everywhere does not mean it obtains for no one, nowhere. And 'many' does 
not mean 'any'. Meanings like 'reality' or 'musicality' are intersubjectively validated social 
constructions and are therefore always inescapably 'relative'. But not in the silly, 
irresponsible sense that they are just arbitrary choices, there for the choosing and 
whatever anyone wants them to be. For they remain deeply embedded in learned patterns 
of human action and response, where they are always being contested, resisted, and 
reconstructed. 
It seems to me, then, that relativism's menacing reputation is primarily 
attributable to four misconceptions: that it is fundamentally skeptical, a view on which, 
because no assertion of musical worth is ultimately unqualified, none is ultimately 
defensible; that it incoherent, irrational, and irresponsible; that it reduces questions of 
musical value to assertions of personal subjective preference, so that 'anything goes'; and 
that it posits the incommensurability of the different frameworks or interpretive schemata 
which, since they constitute radically different ways of being in the world, are doomed to 
pass like ships in the night. With baggage like this it is hardly surprising that despite the 
markedly relativistic character of most contemporary philosophy, few people 
enthusiastically embrace the name "relativism."15 But it is important to separate 
relativism's own baggage from pieces left around by people anxious to discredit it. As 
Margolis has argued, "...contrary to certain popular views of the doctrine, relativism need 
not be committed to the thesis that all alternative claims are equipotent, or that there are 
equipotent reasons for affirming and denying any and all particular claims, or that there is 
and can be no viable basis on which to decide questions of the comparative force of 
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competing views. All relativism need concede is that judgments of comparative force are 
subject to whatever contingencies historicizing and praxicalizing inquiry 
entail....[C]ompelling judgments of superior explanatory power and the like are entirely 
accessible and theoretically welcome…"16 
III: Plurality, Fallibility, Commensurability 
 
As suggested above, one of the more common misconceptions about relativism is 
that it necessarily implicates incommensurability. If all points of view are relative to 
different contexts, there is supposedly no common ground to which we can refer disputes 
and differences. I have asserted that the absence of universals does not render things like 
values and truths completely illusory. There is no denying, however, that it makes them 
considerably more complicated.17 At issue is the extent to which our respective universes 
of discourse (interpretive frameworks, value assumptions, musical practices) articulate 
with one another. Is there sufficient overlap among our beliefs and values to enable 
dialogue and understanding, or are various musical interpretive domains so mutually 
exclusive that they can offer each other nothing but distortion? Does resisting the need 
apparently met by absolutes mean we are set completely adrift or locked in separate 
worlds?  
Incommensurable paradigms and irreconcilable worlds represent an extreme 
possibility that relativism must concede but not a constitutive element of its convictions. 
What a defensible relativism commits to is a more moderate and I think reasonable 
stance, dubious of claims to universality and resistant to the temptation to treat 
differences in kind as differences in value. It also acknowledges and resists the 
temptation to make absolutes of its relativistic persuasions. This it does by 
acknowledging its own 'partiality' or contingency, by accepting its potential fallibility. Its 
persuasiveness rests not upon the irrefutability of its accounts, but on the simple fact its 
claims seem to speak to current needs and interests with less contradiction than 
universalist contenders. In other words, it rejects universals, absolutes, and essences not 
so much because of a conviction its own orientation lies closer to some ultimate truth, but 
because of a distaste for metaphysical extravagance and a belief that ideas of universality 
and invariance are problematic in ways that contingency is not.  
A defensible musical relativism, then, stems from what it regards as positive 
sentiments: that there are many, perhaps even innumerable ways 'music' may be, and 
myriad values musics may have. On this view, calling some particular music 'good' or 
'great' is not an indication that it does exceptionally well what all musics everywhere do, 
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or that it has more essentially-musical attributes than other candidates, or that it has more 
so-called 'intrinsic' value.18 It is simply a compliment paid to certain sonorous doings that 
seem, for the time being, in present company, and for present purposes, particularly apt. 
That they may not speak to all places, people and times, does not mean they are valued 
diffidently or regarded as insubstantial. Acknowledging the relativity or cultural 
situatedness of my musical values does not really require that I hold them any less firmly 
or enthusiastically. They work for me, and for others like me, and that is what counts. 
They are, moreover, a kind of work in progress, a gauge of where I am at the moment. 
That they may change does not disturb me, nor does it undermine my determination to 
bring you around to my point of view where we differ. Only -- and this is I believe 
significant -- it means I must resort to persuasion rather than appeals to knock-you-dead 
absolutes. I think I can get along pretty nicely without things like ultimacy for my beliefs 
and values, and am at least presently persuaded that there are good reasons for trying to 
do so. 
Again, this orientation seems menacing only in the shadow of what Mannheim 
calls "the older static ideal of eternal, unperspectivic truths independent of the subjective 
experience of the observer," judged by what he calls the "alien ideal of absolute truth."19 
Such fears are natural and understandable, the result of the widespread human tendency 
to privilege the familiar. But attitudes of fallibility and suspicion toward the idea of 
ultimacy moderate this tendency in ways that are vitally important. "It is precisely our 
uncertainty," writes Mannheim, "which brings us a good deal closer to reality than was 
possible in former periods which had faith in the absolute."20 Real intellectual progress 
comes only through a "determination to reduce to a minimum the tendency to self 
apotheosis," tempering it with the crucial recognition that "every point of view is 
particular to a social situation."21  In more specifically musical terms, it is not really 
wrong to privilege one's own practices and values so long as we recognize that is what 
we, like others, are doing, and resolve to remain open to other possibilities. One can be 
passionately committed to a particular range of musical experience without claiming that 
it beats all competitors, or insisting that all musical practices conform to its particular 
priorities, or pretending it is the only 'authentic' game in town. 
We listen to others' musics through ears attuned to certain habitual modes of 
musical experience, through modes of interpretation and response that are locally rather 
than universally valid. We all bring to music perspectives, priorities, and beliefs that 
cannot just be cast aside. We cannot just slip out of our own musical skins and into those 
of others. But neither do these habits and predilections render other musics profoundly 
inaccessible. From the fact they are different it does not follow that universes of musical 
9
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discourse are unsharable or unlearnable. Yet the absence of a culturally transcendent 
("aesthetic"?) discursive level for which we are all hard-wired does probably mean that 
we should assume, and strive to cultivate in others, attitudes of respect, tolerance, and 
fallibility to a greater extent than we have under assumptions of non-relative musical 
value. If these statements sound political or moral, that is hardly coincidental: for the 
realm where musical values are distinct from political and moral ones is, like the realm of 
utter objectivity, one without human inhabitants.  
I have asserted that relativism need not implicate incommensurability, and that 
what raises this specter is vestigial belief in the dubious idea that musical value claims 
can be objectively adjudicated. Yet incommensurable situations can and do arise, perhaps 
more frequently than we think. Thomas Kuhn's accounts of scientific 'revolutions' or 
paradigm shifts show that this occurs even in that bastion of presumed objectivity, 
science. What people recognize and accept as 'evidence' is a function of their world 
views, their interpretive schemata. The earth was not flat one day and round the next. 
People used pretty much the same empirical evidence to reach incommensurable 
conclusions. Gradually, the faults and fissures undermining what people regarded as 
proof of the earth's flatness led to an abrupt, seismic shift in the value system that 
regulated what should count as evidence. Are different musical practices 
incommensurable and mutually exclusive like the two opposing views of the shape of the 
earth? Are they private worlds, knowable only to those whose musics they are? That 
hardly seems the case. One can maintain that musical meaning and value are relative and 
specific to particular cultures without suggesting that these are utterly private affairs. I do 
not think we need things like essences or universals to explain how we can sense at least 
some of the significance in musical discourses in which we are not fluent. At the same 
time I think belief in essences and universals tempts people to seriously overestimate 
their understanding of musics and musical practices with which they have only a passing 
familiarity. In short, I suggest that a relativistic orientation to musical value respects 
differences at the same time it resists making absolutes out of them. Most human 
interpretive frameworks are not separated by impermeable boundaries, and can be 
modified by means evolutionary rather than revolutionary. As Margolis observes, "...if 
we do not deny that communities of inquirers may, within their own conceptual horizon, 
overcome incommensurabilities even if they are bound to generate others in the process, 
if we drop the quarrelsome notion of plural actual worlds...if we admit that paradigms are 
not normally assignable clear boundaries, and if we treat incommensurabilities in terms 
of real-time constraints among [people] trying here and now to understand one another's 
conceptual schemes (and succeeding moderately well) rather than in terms of a principled 
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distinction between globally incommunicable systems, then Kuhn's point is an entirely 
reasonable one...."22 
Although I shall only raise the possibility in passing, I suspect absolutistic and 
relativistic philosophies may well be incommensurable with one another. In many 
respects these world views are wholly different, like belief in the earth's flatness and 
roundness. If that is the case, it helps explain why thinkers of the absolutistic bent seem 
to regard relativism as evidence of intellectual melt down. It also suggests that the 
conversion to relativistic convictions may implicate a paradigm shift of the revolutionary 
rather than the evolutionary order. 
Relativism in at least some of its formulations can be a reasonable point of view 
with few of the perils commonly attributed to it. It seems to me quite plausible to 
maintain that humans in different social, cultural, historical, and musical settings should 
employ different beliefs, preconceptions, and perceptual predilections, and that these 
would often be incommensurable in certain respects and varying degrees. But disparate 
conceptual and perceptual propensities are not necessarily like sealed black boxes. As 
long as frontiers remain open and boundaries permeable, and so long as people hold to 
their musical beliefs and values with attitudes of potential fallibility and make sincere 
efforts to approach those of other people with openness, the possibility that musical 
truths and values are local, contingent, and 'relative' does not strike me as invidious. 
 
IV: 'Us' and 'Them' 
 
I have argued that absolutism, universalism, and essentialism are conceptual 
habits born of the need apparently gratified by attempts to stand outside all human needs, 
a need from which there are very good reasons to wean ourselves. Another way to 
describe this 'need' is as a manifestation of the natural human inclination to what 
Mannheim called self-apotheosis. This inclination to privilege our own habitual modes of 
response, the particular patterns of belief and desire into which we are acculturated, is 
commonly known as ethnocentrism, a tendency infamous for its blindness to differences 
and complicity in acts of oppression. Yet this ethnocentric tendency of acculturation also 
serves the positive function of making certain options seem live or momentous in 
comparison to others. Ethnocentrism and self-apotheosis afford necessary protection, one 
might say, from the abject skepticism of which relativism is sometimes (I think wrongly) 
accused. On this view, to commit to one value orientation over another, to privilege one's 
own view, is to indulge a seemingly natural inclination, and one that need not trouble us 
unduly unless it takes a hegemonic or imperialistic turn. Ethnocentrism and acculturation 
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-- induction, if you will, into musical "homes"--are important in defining who 'we' are, 
both as individuals and as societies. But it is important we remain aware that these homes 
are built, not found. And as Rorty reminds, "[W]hen you build a house of Being by 
speaking a language you are automatically giving up a lot of other possible 
understandings of Being, and leaving a lot of differently designed houses unbuilt."23  
To be ethnocentric is simply "to divide the human race into people to whom one 
must justify one's beliefs and others," Rorty reasons: into 'us' and 'them'. "We" includes 
those with whom we share enough of our basic beliefs (whose worlds are sufficiently 
commensurable with our own) "to make fruitful conversation possible."24 Musics and 
musical homes play important roles in establishing and sustaining community. Homes 
are places where we enjoy unconditional presence.25 They are places for 'us' without 
'them', at once inclusionary and exclusionary. The secure sense of 'home' or 'same' is 
possible only where differences are suppressed. Music is an important part of the 
machinery that mediates this saming and othering, because musics are at once the "shared 
prerogatives" of social groups and "expressions of social solidarity against others."26 
The challenge, then, is to build awareness and tolerance for differences into 
acculturation: to build openness to difference and otherness into the values and points of 
view that we privilege. An important step in this effort is to learn to cherish and celebrate 
musical bests without recourse to a persistent "human nature" or "musical nature." This 
means learning to maintain our sense of solidarity politically, without resort to 
metaphysical musings, essentialist enterprises, knock-them-dead musical absolutes. But 
the idea is not just to get rid of our infatuation with objectivity, it is to replace it with 
intersubjectivity; not just to renounce the idea of getting things absolutely right, but to 
replace it with the idea of getting things right relationally, relative to the norms that are 
anchored in nothing more or less substantial than flexible webs of belief, value, and 
practice. Our best chance of transcending the narrowness of acculturation, maintains 
Rorty, is to be raised in a culture that pursues solidarity through openness and prides 
itself on its "tolerance for a plurality of subcultures and its willingness to listen to 
neighboring cultures."27 This task involves making "we" or "us" as inclusive of "them" as 
we can. Belief in a persistent "we" or a durable essence of music offers not to advance 
this cause but rather to impede it.28 
The best way to find out what musics to value or cherish, and why, is and always 
has been to listen to and engage in the doing of as many alternatives, and participate in as 
many energetic critical arguments about them, as possible. Musics are shared habits, 
doings, not convergences upon some elusive, absolute state of being. The objective of 
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musical education should not be to deliver people from the contingencies of human 
activity, but rather to nurture richer and better human activity.29 
I suspect that a 'shrinking' planet and our attendant awareness of the profound 
multiplicity of human musical practices make the need for some form of relativism 
virtually inescapable at the present. The stigma that once attended the word falls away, I 
think, when we come to see relativism not as a negative claim that meanings and values 
are pointless but as a positive commitment to openness, tolerance, plurality, diversity and 
difference. It entails not mindless acceptance, but a respect for the profound plurality of 
musical practices and the impossibility of understanding their value apart from the 
sociocultural situations of which they are a part. The resilience, dynamism, and hybrid 
vigor of relativism make it well suited to the world of change and diversity. Its respect 
for differences, its belief in the provisional character of human understanding, and its 
balanced understanding of the tendency to self-apotheosis make it well-suited to the 
exigencies and contingencies of twenty-first century music educational thought and 
practice.  
At the same time, it raises a number of intriguing questions for music education, 
questions to which I suspect there are neither simple nor global answers -- although that 
does not excuse us from wrestling with them. What is the optimal balance between depth 
and breadth in music education? What dangers attend excessive emphasis in each? 
Whose music should we study? How many musics? How 'different' should they be? Is 
there enough diversity in Western music to meet the concerns identified here? How do 
we avoid the tendency to hear other musics as variants of our own? How can we help 
students experience music 'authentically' in instructional settings that can never attain 
true authenticity? Can we justify music education without recourse to absolutes and 
universals? How can we assure that music instruction meets defensible standards given 
the plurality and relativity of musical practices? And how can we maintain professional 
solidarity in view of the radical diversity of musical and educational practices a 
relativistic orientation seems to validate? 
 
V: Professional Solidarity amid Differences 
 
Each of the questions just raised deserves careful attention. But since space here 
precludes anything approaching an adequate treatment, and since advocates of 'praxial' 
orientations to music education are already subjecting many of these issues to urgently 
needed scrutiny, I will devote my attention in this closing section to the last question 
raised: what might the themes I have been developing here mean for the identity of our 
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profession and the claims we advance in its defense? Music education has been right to 
seek professional solidarity in the nature and value of music, but wrong in believing that 
either of these is as monolithic as past philosophy has instructed us. We have been taught 
that solidarity requires we put forward a united and uniform front, that a strong consensus 
on instructional and philosophical issues is imperative to the viability of the profession, 
and, at least implicitly, that such foundational uniformity can be summed up in a knock-
them-dead answer to the question "Why music education?" What if that traditional quest 
for the ultimate answer has been a mistake? 
In the spirit of the argument that has been put forward thus far, I suggest we 
entertain the possibility that the question "Why music education?" may have no single, 
unassailable answer transcendent of particular time and circumstance. I suggest we 
consider the possibility that there can no more be a definitive resting place in the quest to 
justify our professional efforts than there is an 'all' of music, In other words, I suggest we 
face the possibility that all possible answers to the "why" question are inescapably 
contingent. Musical education can and should take many forms. It can serve many ends, 
have diverse and divergent values. Conspicuous among these are the many familiar, 
inspirational claims mounted on our behalf over the years. What is less often 
acknowledged, however, is that music and musical education may have adverse as well 
as beneficial outcomes. A musical education is not an unconditional good, because it 
does nothing automatically. Most of us recognize that music in itself does not possess the 
kind of inherent or intrinsic value that can guarantee a desirable outcome for any and all 
educational efforts. As human undertakings, music and music education are not inherent 
'goods'. All depends upon what is taught, when, how, to whom, and so forth. That is, all 
answers to "Why music education?" are contingent. Only contingency is not cause for 
despair because it no more implicates arbitrariness than relativity does. It need not 
undermine our professional solidarity because professional solidarity in music education 
does not really require that the "why" question have a single answer. Professional 
solidarity can be sustained without absolutes. 
Among the contingencies that bear upon the "why" question are one's 
assumptions as to whom "we" might be: as to what and whom the notion of 'music 
education' or 'music educator' includes. The reasons we are inclined to advance in its 
defense can differ dramatically depending upon what we think music education is all 
about. Those for whom it is synonymous with public school music (a wide spread and, in 
my view, unfortunate assumption) interpret the 'why' question as an invitation to defend 
or justify arrangements designed to replicate the musical practices commonly associated 
with those institutions. But if my concept of music education has its roots in, say, my 
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experience teaching jazz improvisation to university students, or general music to 
toddlers, or piano lessons in my home, or coaching a string quartet, or directing a church 
choir, or fielding a marching band -- to mention just a few practices that I suspect are 
considered musically educational by those who engage in them -- my assumptions as to 
what I am being asked to justify cannot help but differ from yours. What my students and 
I get from what we do together may be pretty different from you get from yours. In other 
words, our reasons for doing what we do and the ways we try to justify it are as different 
as the instructional activities in which we engage and the musics we teach. That is very 
different. Both 'education' and 'music' are open concepts with multiple valid meanings 
that are relative to circumstance, and subject to change. Music education names a set of 
diverse and divergent practices that cannot really be accommodated by a single, unified 
theory, or supported by one grand foundational premise. 
And yet, because of our yearning for invincible advocacy arguments and our 
willingness to delegate the task of their construction to others, music educators have 
more often than not resorted to justifications that purport to speak to everything at once, 
justifications that are built and operate at quite a conceptual distance from our actual 
musical doings. As a result, the gap between our claims for music education and our 
musical and instructional practices, between what we say and do, between our promises 
and our actions, is immense. 'Music education' encompasses a remarkably diverse array 
of beliefs, practices, and values. It is a convenient label for a host of different 
undertakings, many of which may have relatively little in common with each other. Like 
'music', it is an abstraction, the name of a category of actions, a tool that we use to 
designate a disparate array of particular enterprises and endeavors.  
Referring to these diverse doings as if they were one is convenient, and in itself a 
relatively harmless habit. But trouble begins when we attempt to bring that same habit to 
bear on our "why?" question, as if behind this divergent array of practices there were a 
common set of essential or global attributes upon which we can draw for justification of 
our efforts. We wrongly assume that music education is a sufficiently monolithic and 
unitary thing to support the kind of definitive answers that speak to the worth of all 
practices at once. Music education is important because all music education does ___ .30 
It is precisely at this point, it seems to me, that we turn our backs on what we personally 
know and do best, and take to philosophical flights of fancy. 
I find myself wondering if perhaps the reason we have yet to find this elusive, 
definitive, global answer to "Why music education?" after years of arduous searching is 
that one doesn't exist, that there is no one thing it is music's job to do. When we assume 
there is, and set out to devise theories to describe it, our claims become pretty remote 
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from what many of us are actually doing. Our claims stray from the concrete practices 
from which they derive their validity and cogency, and begin to ring hollow. I suspect, 
for instance, that this may account in part for our curious attempts to explain musical 
education without any reference to the uniqueness of sonorous experience; or in terms of 
its fundamentally 'cognitive' nature to the utter neglect of corporeality and spirituality; or 
in terms of putative psychological benefits to the neglect of the social; or in terms of the 
supposed 'aesthetic' commonalities it shares with education in 'the other arts'. At the same 
time, I believe, many of our noble claims function in an exclusionary fashion for many 
people engaged in musically educational practices whose aspirations may differ 
substantially from 'ours'.31 
I suggest we take the "why?" question in a slightly different way, without 
assuming it requires a single answer or that there exists a single yardstick by which we 
can measure and compare various answers. There is no single answer applicable to all of 
music education's diverse practices, and no 'best' answer either, because each answer's 
cogency can only be determined in light of particular and distinctive systems of values, 
beliefs, circumstances, and practices. 
I do not believe there is an 'intrinsic' nature-of-all-music to whose illumination or 
realization all music education contributes. Nor, I think it follows, is there a definitively 
best way to teach it, one guaranteed to yield something people everywhere will regard as 
inherently desirable or valuable. Musics and instructional practices are human behaviors 
embedded in social contexts and practices. Their natures and values are plural, malleable, 
unstable, and ever changing. So to "Why music education?" I am inclined to respond that 
there are many potential answers, each with its own claim to some degree of local 
validity, and none which can claim to obtain for all times and places and circumstances. 
We may well have been right to insist that music education philosophy follow from the 
nature and value of music. But, to reiterate the central point of this essay, we have been 
wrong to think that either of these is singular. 
'Many' does not mean 'limitless', however, nor will just any old response to the 
"why?" question do. None of this means that no answer is better than another, or that 
answers need not be attempted. I am arguing from a responsible relativism, not silly 
nihilism. Music education must intervene, cultivate, and refine, even though it can do so 
in a variety of ways. Conceding contingency and plurality and relativity-- the validity of 
diverse and divergent answers to "Why music education?"-- does not alleviate our 
responsibility to debate and justify why we do what we do, or how we propose to go 
about it.32 I do think that it does free us up a bit, though, by relieving us of the sense that 
we are obliged to subscribe to a common doctrine or else compromise our professional 
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integrity. It frees us from the restrictive notion that all our hopes and aspirations rest on 
the validity and persuasiveness of one argument, or that to be found worthy all our 
instructional efforts must converge on one common end. And it frees us from the 
frustration of trying to fit square pegs into round holes -- marching bands into lofty 
revelations of human sentience, for instance. 
Once again, denying the existence of a definitive answer sounds negative when it 
need not. The positive side of this argument is that it allows for many answers, the 
existence of an exciting range of choice. Professional solidarity requires neither 
uniformity nor unanimity. Crucial though it is, solidarity can be forged amidst diversity 
and difference. The case for music education is not compromised but strengthened by its 
capacity to be many things and serve many ends. Diversity and differences are not signs 
of professional weakness but sources of vitality and resilience. Music and music 
education are intricate webs of dynamic beliefs and practices. Unlike monoliths, webs are 
casual, temporary affairs whose power comes of their portability and flexibility. They 
require routine maintenance, of course, but there is good in that, too. In fact, that has 
been one of my central points here. 
Why music education? There are lots and lots (and lots) of good answers. I see no 
compelling reason for us to designate one of them definitive or best. Neither music nor 
education are that kind of thing. It seems to me more constructive to explore a variety of 
different answers and see how they fit particular circumstances, how well they serve 
particular needs and ends. Justifying what we do to others (and to each other, and to 
ourselves) is professionally important business, but we can do that very well without a 
single answer to which we must all subscribe. An important corollary to this line of 
thought is that music educators should have more faith in their own personal answers to 
this question: answers buttressed by first hand experience, by having seen music's 
powerful influence in their lives and the lives of their students. These reasons can be 
'locally' valid and persuasive without claiming applicability to all musical situations for 
all time. Music and music education achieve nothing automatically: all depends upon 
what is taught, in what manner, to whom, by whom, and to what ends. Perhaps this is 
what R. Murray Schafer had in mind when he suggested music educators devise 
philosophies for themselves, not for others. 33   
In the end I do not think denying the seductive lure of essentialism, universalism, 
and grand metaphysical schemes needs to compromise our sense of professional 
solidarity in the least. As Richard Rorty points out, solidarity is simply a function of 
"which similarities and dissimilarities strike us as salient."34  Such salience is, I have now 
said repeatedly, a function of belief and habit, not of essential attributes. Professional 
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solidarity consists in a sense of inclusiveness among ourselves, and between ourselves 
and others. That, Rorty reminds, is a matter of imaginative identification with others' 
undertakings rather than discovery of things antecedentally shared.35  We can achieve and 
maintain, and indeed even strengthen professional solidarity without appeal to some 
built-in 'nature' of music or music education. Like musical value, professional solidarity 
is made, not found. 
Forging solidarity amidst relativism and contingency may sound contradictory but 
it is not. Music education, like 'music', is a mosaic, a collectivity rich in diversity and 
vitality, replete with exciting options. Neither requires a central discipline or doctrine to 
hold it together; nor is either particularly well served by sharply defined boundaries that 
demarcate its scope and sphere of influence. I concede that the re-conceptualization I 
have urged here would require copious amounts of energy and involve risk. But the 
comfort and security we have sought in other strategies strikes me as having been largely 
illusory. I suspect that a profession guided by convictions and commitments like those 
explored here might prove far more comfortable and inviting for people with excitingly 
different ideas, musics, and values. 
I think it time to dismantle some the anachronistic conceptual edifices that have 
traditionally guided our thoughts about music and music education. To say that music 
and music education have many natures and values and to acknowledge the contingency 
of these does not diminish the significance of what we do, nor need it compromise our 
professional solidarity. We can get along nicely without universalist discourses in music 
education and I hope I have shown that there are many important reasons to try. 
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